Using Russian assets frozen in Belgium to help Ukraine is in accordance with international law.

Opinion piece published in the newspaper Le Soir on 4 December 2025 under the title " Utiliser les avoirs russes gelés en Belgique pour aider l’Ukraine est conforme au droit international "

How to finance aid to Ukraine? The answer was given last March by 140 Nobel laureates. They suggested that governments holding frozen Russian assets "release these funds to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine and to compensate war victims so that the country can be quickly rebuilt after a peace agreement is reached." A proposal along these lines is being promoted by the European Commission: a €140 billion reparations loan would be granted to Ukraine, guaranteed by the assets of the Russian Central Bank that have been frozen since 2022. Russia could, in principle, regain ownership of these assets once peace is signed, after repaying Ukraine, which would make the reparations loan temporary and reversible.

At the European Council meeting on October 23, Prime Minister De Wever opposed this. Belgium is indeed one of the countries most affected: a Belgian company, Euroclear, holds a large portion of the Russian assets deposited in Europe, specifically €193 billion. Mr. De Wever questioned the legality of such a measure under international law and a bilateral agreement between Belgium and USSR. Furthermore, he rightly objected to Belgium bearing the sole burden of such a decision.

His objections were addressed on November 24th by the statement of the President of the European Commission before the European Parliament. She specified that the legislative proposal to be tabled at the next European Council meeting (December 18-19) rests on solid legal foundations. She added, "I see no scenario in which European taxpayers alone would foot the bill." However, on November 27th, Mr. De Wever reaffirmed his opposition, putting forward a new argument: the Commission's proposal would disrupt the ongoing discussions surrounding the "peace deal."

It is therefore necessary to examine the strength of his arguments, given that the public debate has thus far remained largely focused on his perspective and that of Euroclear. Many legal experts have long since dismissed the argument that such the Commission’s proposal is illegal under international law. Indeed, Russia has been recognised by the United Nations General Assembly as responsible for the aggression against Ukraine. It falls under what customary international law has codified as "state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts." The legality of the proposal is based on this codification, developed by the UN International Law Commission, which recognises the right of states to resort to countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act.

The Prime Minister's request for risk-sharing is understandable. It would be neither fair nor sustainable for Belgium to bear the potential financial consequences of a European decision alone. In presenting the legislative proposal on December 3, the President of the Commission stated that virtually all of Belgium's concerns had been taken into account, with very robust safeguards. “One thing is certain: we will share the burden equitably, as is the European tradition.” Other European countries that are not EU members could also contribute to mitigating the risks.

The bilateral treaty that Belgium and Luxembourg concluded with the USSR in 1989, mentioned by the government, concerns investments. One can therefore question whether it applies to the mere presence of funds in a bank account with a depository institution such as Euroclear, and thus whether Russia could use it to challenge a European decision. On this subject too, it seems to us that the risk should not be overestimated.

One of the main arguments is that central banks and investors would lose confidence in Euroclear, in Belgium, the European Union, and the Eurozone. This argument deserves some considerations. The measures announced do not target ordinary assets, but those of a state recognised by the United Nations General Assembly as responsible for armed aggression. Such “internationally wrongful acts” are, fortunately, extremely rare; the countermeasures that address them are therefore not intended to be widespread. Two rating agencies have just issued an opinion that the decision would not affect the ratings of European states.

One might wonder whether, by publicly expressing a fear of loss of reputation, one is not actually contributing to fuelling this fear. Invoking reputational risk in this context would be tantamount to arguing that one should refrain from seizing the bank accounts of drug traffickers or the proceeds of corruption, on the grounds that this might worry other clients about the security of their funds. It is precisely the opposite: the reputation of a financial system is built on its ability to distinguish between legitimate and illicit assets and to handle the latter in accordance with the law.

The new argument put forward, namely that a decision by the European Union would jeopardise the peace deal, raises other kinds of questions. The American plan stipulates, in particular, that Russian assets frozen in Europe would simply be released, as if the decision belonged solely to the two protagonists of the deal and that Russia could be absolved of any obligation to provide compensation. Such a conception would amount to Western taxpayers, rather than Russia, bearing the bulk of the reconstruction costs.

Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Russia will emerge victorious from the war, as military experts point out. Conditioning the European position on such an uncertain scenario would unnecessarily weaken an important instrument of leverage and turn its back on a basic principle of international justice: a state that commits aggression cannot expect peace on its own terms, without reparations for the victims.

Once the legality of the proposal under international law is established and that risk pooling is proposed, many other concerns are fading away. It would be regrettable if, by not adhering to the European decision, Belgium were to lose credibility as a supporter of Ukraine.

Signataires

1. Francis Biesmans, Economist-Statistician, Professor Emeritus, University of Lorraine

2. Samuel Cogolati, Doctor of International Law (KU Leuven)

3. Paul De Grauwe, Professor, John Paulson Chair in European Political Economy, London School of Economics and Political Science

4. Pierre Klein, Professor, Centre for International Law, ULB

5. André Lange, formerly researcher at Liège and Manchester University, retired agent  of an international organisation

6. Gerard Roland, formerly E. Morris Cox Professor of Economics and Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and ULB